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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF CARE-MANUFACTURER'S DuTY To WARN OF
OBVIOUS DANGERS-Plaintiff purchased a "Lithe-Line" exerciser, a rubber rope forty inches long with a loop on each end, manufactured
by defendant Helena Rubenstein, Inc. With the exerciser plaintiff received
a leaflet of instructions stating that "anybody" could reduce with it, and
containing sketches and descriptions of eight exercises. While plaintiff
was lying on the floor with the rope under her feet doing one of the
exercises, the rope slipped off her feet and snapped back, hitting her in
the eye and causing partial loss of vision. She sued the manufacturer for
negligence,! alleging that the exerciser was inherently dangerous when
used as directed, and that defendant had a duty to warn her of such
danger. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, held, affirmed, four judges dissenting. A manufacturer has no duty to warn of an obvious danger. That the impact and
extent of recoil of a rubber rope are proportional to the tension placed

1 Plaintiff also unsuccessfully sued the retailer.
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upon it, and · that the rope might slip, are dangers so obvious as to
warrant summary judgment without submission of the case to the jury.
Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 23.
If a manufacturer, supplying an article inherently dangerous for use
in its existing state, realizes or should realize that the article is dangerous,
and the ultimate purchaser cannot justifiably be expected to recognize
the danger, the manufacturer has a duty to warn the purchaser of the
dangerous condition.2 When the article is of simple construction, and its
properties are a matter of common knowledge so that the dangers are
obvious to the uneducated purchaser as well as to the manufacturer, a
duty to warn becomes superfluous and unnecessary as a matter of law.3
Thus ·there is no duty to warn that a knife or axe will cut, a match will
take fire, dynamite will explode, or a hammer will mash a finger. 4 Likewise, since the dangers arising from the explosive nature of phosphorous5
and the highly inflammable quality of a "Fuzzy-Wuzzy" lounging robe6
are commonly apparent, it has been held that there is no duty to warn
of these dangers as a matter of law. Also kept from the jury have been
actions in which personal injuries resulted from splashing a cleansing
agent into the eye,7 pulling a starting rope on a gasoline motor, 8 and
2 See 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT §§388, 392 (1934); James, "Products Liability,'' 34 TEX.
L. REv. 44 (1955); Dillard and Hart, "Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty
To Warn," 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955). The situation should also be considered where
injury results, not to the purchaser or user as in the principal case, but .to a casual bystander. 2 TORTS REsTATEMENT §388, comment d (1934) states that the manufacturer's
liability for failure to warn of the dangerous condition of the chattel extends " .•. to
third persons in whose vicinity the supplier intends or should expect it to be used."
To the effect that knowledge by the purchaser of the danger may be an intervening
cause insulating the manufacturer from liability, see Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co.,
271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930).
s Some courts have considered the question of apparentness of danger as pertinent
to the issue of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk by plaintiff. See De
Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., (3d Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 409; Karsteadt v. Phillip
Gross H. & S. Co., 179 Wis. 110, 190 N.W. 844 (1922). But see Dillard and Hart, "Product
Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty To Warn," 41 VA. L. REv. 145 at 163 (1955),
stating that " . . . they are theoretically inapplicable when the defendant's breach of
duty is based on a failure to warn. To allow these defenses is to indulge in circular reasoning, since usually the plaintiff cannot be said to have assumed a risk of which he was
ignorant or to have contributed to his own injury when he had no way of reasonably
ascertaining that the danger of injury existed." This language was cited with approval
in Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., (2d Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 53.
4 Principal case at 26; Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, Inc., 239 Mo. App. 355,
186 S.W. (2d) 217 (1945). See also James, "Products Liability,'' 34 TEX. L. REv. 44 at 51
(1955).
5 Gibson v. Torbert, 115 Iowa 163, 88 N.W. 443 (1901). But cf. Wellington v. Downer
Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870), holding that whether people knew dangerous
qualities of naphtha is a jury question.
6 Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores, Inc., note 4 supra. Cf. Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc.,
268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 460 (1944), affd. 294 N.Y. 680, 60 N.E. (2d) 839 (1945),
reinstating a jury verdict for plaintiff holding defendant liable for failure to warn that
the netting of a dress treated with nitro-cellulose sizing was highly inflammable.
7 Sawyer v. Pine Oil Sales Co., (5th Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 855.
s Pontifex v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (4th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 909.
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bringing one's hands into contact with caustic ready-mix concrete.9 When,
however, the article or process involved is less common or more complicated, so that the manufacturer because of superior technical knowledge
should realize the danger, whereas the less experienced user might not,
the issue becomes a jury question.10 Whether a worker should realize that
dynamite will prematurely explode from heat in the borehole or vibrations from nearby drilling has therefore been held a matter for the jury
to determine.11 So also the possible dangers inherent in too short a boom
cable on a crane12 or a drum of sulphuric acid left to heat in the sun13
were sufficiently obscure to warrant submitting the question to the jury.
A third group of cases, in which the manufacturer by representing that
his product is "harmless" lulls the user into a false sense of security, indicates an even greater hesitance on the part of judges to find for the manufacturer as a matter of law.14 Thus the manufacturer who advertised
that sparks from a sparkler15 or a toy gun16 were "harmless" faced a jury
determination of whether the user was aware of the danger when injury
in fact resulted. Summary judgment in the principal case can therefore
be justified only if the rubber exerciser falls within the first class of articles
whose dangerous qualities are equally apparent to the user and the manufacturer. The dissenting judges argued that defendant's representation
that "anybody" could reduce with the exerciser might well have induced
false security in the plaintiff, and thus the case was for the jury under
a theory similar to that of the "harmless sparkler" decision.17 Including
the exerciser in the first group, however, is a logical extension of that
category to include somewhat less common, but simple non-mechanical
devices, which are based on universally known principles and which
possess physical attributes identical with everyday articles of familiar
character. Here the exerciser was merely a forty-inch rubber rope having
no mechanical parts or latent defects. It was designed on the same principle and presented similar inherent dangers as a rubber band or slingshot. It is a matter of common knowledge, obvious to the user as well as to

o Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Wash. (2d) 946, 227 P. (2d) 173 (1951).
2 TORTS REsTATEJ\IENT §388, comment i (1934).
11 Hopkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (3d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 930. Cf.
Hopkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., (3d Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 623, cert. den. sub
nom. Hopkins Admx. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours 8: Co., 348 U.S. 872 (1954), reversing
a jury verdict for plaintiff, holding as a matter of law that since the blasting foreman
had knowledge of the danger, the manufacturer was not negligent in failing to warn.
12 Lambert v. Richards-Kelly Constr. Co., 348 Pa. 407, 35 A. (2d) 76 (1944).
13 Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. (2d) 303, 239 P. (2d) 48 (1951).
14 See 2 TORTS REsTATEJ\IENT §388, comment b (1934).
15 Henry v. Crook, 202 App. Div. 19, 195 N.Y.S. 642 (1922).
16 Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496 (1930), affd. 255 N.Y.
624, 175 N.E. 341 (1931). But note dissent arguing toy was of simple construction, that
it was a matter of common knowledge that sparks applied to inflammable material will
start a fire, and that the toy gun was not inherently dangerous.
17 Principal case at 37 et seq.
10 See
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the manufacturer, that when these articles are stretched, they may slip, and
if they slip, they will snap back with a force proportional fo the amount
of tension placed upon them. Representing that "anybody" could reduce
by using the exerciser would not make these dangers less apparent to
the adult user in the principal case, as the representation that something
was "harmless" might make an otherwise obvious danger less apparent to
a child. Therefore, no jury question was presented. To hold otherwise,
and permit the jury to determine whether these dangers were obvious to
the plaintiff, would place an unjustifiable burden on the manufacturer in
the present atmosphere of recognized jury leniency toward the personal
injury plaintiff.
George R. Haydon, Jr.

